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INTRODUCTION
“Now, in 2004, with Al Qaeda having risen and mostly fallen, the threats that
US intelligence must monitor in the current decade have in a sense returned to
what existed in the early 1990s; only now the threat has many more moving
parts, more geographically disparate operations, and more ideological momen-
tum.” The author of these lines, Paul R. Pillar, former deputy chief of the CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center and now at the National Intelligence Council
(Washington, DC), is quite adamant about the state Osama bin Laden’s network
is in today: “The disciplined, centralized organization that carried out the Sep-
tember 11 attacks is no more. Al Qaeda still has the capacity to inflict lethal
damage, but the key challenges for current counterterrorism efforts are not as
much Al Qaeda as what will follow Al Qaeda.”1
In public perception and political discourse terrorism is still widely perceived as
a more or less structured international movement – an image Osama bin Laden,
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and other jihadi spokespersons themselves are eager to
uphold. Using century-old symbols and myths such as al-Andalus and a
Caliphate reborn, portraying themselves as warriors of the global jihad, in an
epochal struggle with the West, terrorist leaders are indeed hoping for this per-
ception of a major global threat to last forever.
Four years after 9/11 however, Islamist – or better: jihadi – terrorism is poles
apart from what it was in 2001. The international, regional and domestic
endeavours against al-Qaeda, including the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan,
have indeed been much more successful than most people realize. Compared to
previous attempts at international cooperation to counter international terror-
ism, today’s international counterterrorist cooperation is a success story indeed.
By historical standards, an unprecedented level of cooperation and mutual sup-
port now exists among countries, international organizations and other partners
all around the world. Never before has the number of states supporting terror-
ism been so small.2
Recognizing that the global cooperation against terrorism has been quite suc-
cessful, the Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has warned that this is never-
theless “insufficient to ultimately win the war against it”. At the September
1. Paul R. Pillar, ‘Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda’, in: The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004,
27:3, pp. 101-113
2. For a detailed analysis of today’s international terrorism, I refer to my: Al-Qaeda: The Myth.
The Root Causes of International Terrorism and How to Tackle Them. Ghent, Academia Press,
2005
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2004 United Nations General Assembly he stressed the need for a clear, long-
term strategy striking at the root of the problem: an internal socio-economic
reform in the Muslim world, which is of course the responsibility of the govern-
ments in place, but also an “active support from the major powers to ensure
political justice and socio-economic revival for all Islamic peoples.” Action is
needed, he cautioned, before “an iron curtain finally descends between the West
and the Islamic world”.
Al-Qaeda has left a heavy imprint indeed. Its main contribution has consisted in
plugging into existing insurgencies, rebellions and local brands of terrorism and
offering an overarching jihadi perspective to these groups, who until then merely
had their own local agenda.3 Al-Qaeda stitched together local opposition
groups and disenchanted youngsters in migrant communities in Europe in a
shared world view of a worldwide oppressed Ummah, offering a salafist reading
of the Koran as the religion of the oppressed – an ideological role once played
by Marxism. Al-Qaeda has now ceased to be a formidable foe by itself, but it
has become an inspiring myth to others. Local groups are being inspired by this
myth, rather than being beholden to bin Laden. What is generally dubbed ‘inter-
national terrorism’ can best be compared to mercury blobs of a broken ther-
mometer, all highly toxic, but unconnected to one another.
Most of the post-9/11 attacks, such as Casablanca (May 2003), Istanbul
(November 2003), Madrid (April 2004) or the brutal murder of the controver-
sial Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh (November 2004), point in the same
direction. Their perpetrators are largely locally (or regionally) organized, self-
sustained with microfinancing schemes such as cloned credit cards and fake or
stolen ID papers, mobile phone cards and car trafficking, or the smuggle of
precious stones or metals, operating without external support or instructions,
and unaffiliated with what remains of an al-Qaeda hierarchy.
Jihadi terrorism today is a ‘glocal’ phenomenon: its core is essentially local, but
its appearances are global. Even if remnants of the old structured al-Qaeda net-
work probably still remain at large, al-Qaeda has failed to gain significant trac-
tion for actions in Europe and the United States. Jihadi terrorism now basically
is a cloak patched from different sources of local discontent, real and perceived,
stitched together by a puritanical and radical interpretation of Islam, and thriv-
ing on an enabling global momentum.
The root causes underlying this particular brand of terrorism are composed of
one major global root cause and a multitude of local root causes.
3. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London, Hearst, 2004
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The main global root cause is an enabling global environment, characterised by
an astonishing degree of solidarity amongst Muslim communities worldwide,
build upon shared feelings of humiliation, bitterness and besiegement. The local
root causes widely vary, depending on the continents and the countries involved
and have nothing to do with 11 September. They range from decades-old sepa-
ratist longings in a number of countries with large Muslim minorities, the peace
process between Palestinians and Israelis, a darkened social, political and eco-
nomic horizon for hundreds of thousands of young Arabs, and a failing integra-
tion in Europe of second and third generation youngsters from migrant commu-
nities with a Muslim background.
Where Europe departs  from the American Global War 
on Terrorism
The United States widely perceives international terrorism as a global external
threat – and quite understandably so in view of the magnitude of the 9/11
attacks. In the US, international terrorism is often portrayed as similar in scope
to Nazism and Communism, threatening the very foundations of the global pol-
ity. The West and the US in particular are considered to be the primary targets
of this new form of authoritarianism. As it is seen as probably lasting for dec-
ades, the ensuing strategy is a long-term domestic mobilisation of the nation,
combined with a mobilisation of the international community in a hunt for
Islamist terrorists.
The American global war on terrorism has become the central organising prin-
ciple of US foreign and defence policy, comparable to the Cold War containment
strategy. It basically rests upon a global decapitation strategy, a worldwide hunt
for known terrorists, as well as an interdiction strategy, trying to deny terrorist
groups the possibility to take advantage of local opportunities. Its military
dimension is paramount, even to the point of creating turf wars with other US
agencies.4 Since the advent of the second Bush administration, the global war on
terrorism has been couched in a more positive democracy-pursuing strategy, but
the thrust of the strategy has remained unchanged.
4. During the presidencies of G.H. Bush and B. Clinton, the Department of Defence played a sub-
ordinate role in anti-terrorism. The 1996 Khobar bombings (Saudi-Arabia), where 19 American
soldiers died, resulted in a more pronounced role for the Pentagon in counterterrorism (defensive
force protection) and anti-terrorism (offensive operations). See: The Military. Washington,
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 6, s.d.
[2004]
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Europeans share with Americans the conviction that no quick fixes for short-
term success in the struggle against today’s terrorism exist. But in several impor-
tant aspects, Europe’s fight against terrorism departs from the American war on
terrorism.
Even if the European reflection on the very nature of contemporary interna-
tional terrorism is not as elaborate and well thought-off as one might wish, the
prevailing feeling in Europe is that simply going after known terrorists and their
leadership, preventing financial flows and putting an excessive emphasis on
coercion and force, is an unsatisfactory counterterrorist strategy. The interna-
tional mechanisms of sanctions and suppression have been very effective imme-
diately after 9/11, but are gradually becoming less and less relevant, because – as
a result of the decentralisation and atomisation of jihadism – they address a set
of circumstances which no longer apply.5
Characteristic of the European approach to counterterrorism is the constant
reminder of the need to address the root causes of terrorism.6 In its December
2004 meeting, the European Council once again stressed this approach:
“The European Council reiterated its conviction that in order to be
effective in the long run the Union's response to terrorism must
address the root causes of terrorism. Radicalisation and terrorist
recruitment can be closely connected. The European Council called on
the Council to establish a long-term strategy and action plan on both
issues by June 2005, building on the report on recruitment recently
adopted by the Council. It invited the Secretary-General/High Repre-
sentative and the Commission to submit proposals to this effect.”7
5. First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed persuant to
resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and enti-
ties. New York, United Nations, 25 August 2004 (doc S/2004/679)
6. That the US-led Global War on Terrorism does not address root causes at all, is probably too
sweeping a generalisation. ‘“Roots” was a taboo in the Bush administration for a time, with “evil”
the only acceptable explanation for the attacks of September 11,’ according to the Washington
Post on 24 December 2002. Nevertheless, then CIA Director George J. Tenet was the first major
American official to venture into the complex world of the root causes of terrorism as part of his
Worldwide Threat Briefing, delivered on 11 February, 2003: ‘The numbers of societies and peoples
excluded from the benefits of an expanding global economy, where the daily lot is hunger, disease,
and displacement – and that produces large populations of disaffected youth who are prime
recruits for our extremist foes.’ Formally, the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
issued also in February 2003, confirmed the need to address similar ‘root causes’. Such statements
however seem to be somewhat out of synch with the ongoing Global War on Terrorism.
7. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004 (Doc 16238/1/04
Rev 1)
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Within the EU, there is a widely shared belief that the war in Afghanistan was
and will remain the only part of the post-9/11 counterterrorism effort where
military means played a significant role. In the European counterterrorism
approach there certainly is an important part to be played by the European
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but its military dimension – the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – is mostly seen as complemen-
tary and supportive of other policy instruments.8
Moreover, it is probably not far off the mark to state that another major differ-
ence between the American war on terrorism and Europe’s fight against terror-
ism lies in the perception of the very nature of these root causes of terrorism.
Europeans seem to widely share the assumption that the root causes of jihadi
terrorism in the rest of the world are mainly local – just as is the case in Europe
itself. Whereas the US Global War on Terrorism considers local terrorist groups
to be part of a global Islamist insurgency, the EU’s point of departure
– admittedly more implicit than explicit due to a lack of in-depth reflection –
would be to consider international terrorism to have returned to what existed
before the rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s: even if they use the same salafist rhet-
oric and thriving on a more enabling international momentum, most terrorist
groups are primarily driven by domestic grievances, that remain the main drive
behind their actions.
The successful al-Qaeda imprint gave rise to the perception of a formidable foe
of global dimensions. In order to devise a strategy effectively dealing with the
specific environment and dynamics of each of the local and regional terrorist
groups, this perception needs to be deconstructed.9
The existing European counterterrorism strategy thus encompasses both the
prevention of terrorist acts and endeavours to tackle the root causes at the glo-
bal, regional and local level. It points – at least rhetorically – to the need to
complement the necessary repressive dimension of its strategy with a long-term
political involvement, albeit not yet formalised in any detailed counterterrorism
strategy.
8. The main areas of action of the ESDP contribution to counterterrorism are identified as follows:
prevention, protection, response/consequence management and support to third countries. See:
Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism. Council of the
European Union, DG E VIII/EUMS, 14797/04, 18 November 2004
9. This lack of international consensus on the very essence of the Islamist threat was also raised in:
Van dawa tot jihad. De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde.
Den Haag, December 2004
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The threat being multifaceted and multidimensional, any such strategy needs to
contain at its core a joint common focus in the many different dimensions it
seeks to address, for European counterterrorism efforts to be coherent and effec-
tive in the long term. To this effect, this paper offers a three pronged approach:
(1) repression and prevention of terrorist acts, (2) tackling local root causes,
both within the EU and worldwide, (3) bridging a global perception gap.
Prevention of terrorist  acts – and its  l imits
Preparedness to and prevention of new terrorist attacks form the corner stones
of the homeland security dimension of the American counterterrorism strategy.
For the EU too, repression and prevention of terrorist acts constitute the neces-
sary first level of any counterterrorism strategy. Combining repression and pre-
vention within a joint approach has been a conceptual revolution for all author-
ities involved, as has been the need for a close relationship – born out of neces-
sity – between law enforcement authorities and the intelligence agencies. In
some European countries, including France and Belgium, both institutional rev-
olutions have been rather well integrated into daily practice since the 90s or even
earlier, whereas in others institutional hurdles have proven to be much harder
to take.
The first responsibility for this dimension lies with the local and the national
authorities within the member states. But intra-European and international
cooperation is a vital complement. Since 11 September, boosted by 11 March,
the EU and its member states have intensified the domestic, intra-EU and inter-
national coordination of intelligence, police and judiciary efforts and devised
new juridical, political and intelligence instruments in order to trace, prosecute
and punish terrorist individuals and groups. It is stating the obvious when stress-
ing that this endeavour needs to be continued so as to be able to prevent as much
as possible new terrorist acts from being committed.
Even when considering that jihadi terrorism has largely returned to a pre-9/11
situation, and is thus largely driven by local dynamics, this nevertheless does not
imply that no transnational links exist between jihadists in different countries.
They clearly do. Some jihadi militants are known to travel profusely and to liaise
regularly with one another through regional networking.10 Usually no real
operational coordination exists between these home-grown groups, only spo-
10. The GICM (Groupe islamique combattant marocain) and Jemaah Islamiyah are examples of
such loose regional networks of jihadists, but which do not amount to well-established structured
organisations.
academia-egmont.papers.5.book  Page 8  Monday, April 18, 2005  3:37 PM
LONG-TERM COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
9
radic and volatile contacts – similar to those existing between the 19th-century
anarchist terrorists. Within the network of Sunni Islamic extremists, according
to Paul R. Pillar, almost everyone can be linked, at least indirectly, to almost
everyone else: the overwhelming majority of these linkages, however, only con-
sist of casual contacts and do not involve preparations of terrorist operations.
But since these contacts are part and parcel of the behaviour and tactics of local
jihadi groups, transnational coordination and sharing of information between
the relevant authorities, both within the EU and internationally, remain crucial
elements of any long-term counterterrorist strategy. Identified gaps need to be
addressed in order to enhance preparedness and maximise the chances of attacks
being averted.11
But international and intra-EU cooperation against terrorism has been least suc-
cessful where it matters most: victory will not be achieved as long as the circum-
stances are not addressed by which individuals turn into terrorists, both in
Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, and in consistency with its proclaimed objec-
tive of addressing the root causes of terrorism, the EU has attempted to identify
the mechanisms by which terrorists are recruited. In the course of 2004, the
factors underlying the recruitment of terrorists have been identified as follows:
radicalisation, regional conflicts and failed or failing states, globalisation and
socio-economic factors, alienation, propagation of an extremist worldview, sys-
tems of education.
These underlying factors however have never been prioritised, nor made fully
operational. Within this broad array of enabling circumstances, the EU has
increasingly focused on one single factor, which is being privileged above all
others: the radicalisation process by which ultimately individuals turn into ter-
rorists. It is nowadays a common thread within EU counterterrorism thinking
and action to single out this radicalisation process as the main focal point in
combating terrorism.
Tackling terrorist recruitment through this radicalisation process strategy is
inherently difficult. Still, in a sense it also is the ‘easiest’ root cause to address,
as it allows for the identification of particular ‘hot spots’ where this radicalisa-
11. Efforts by the European Union to combat terrorism. Contribution to the orientation debate in
COREPER. Council of the European Union, JAI/7177/04, 8 March 2004. A thorough analysis of
EU policies concerning terrorism is provided by: Franklin Dehousse, Annabelle Littoz-Monnet,
L’Union européenne face au défi du terrorisme. Brussels, 24 March 2005 (Studia Diplomatica,
forthcoming). EPC policy analyst Mirjam Dittrich gives a good overview of the post 9/11 EU
responses to terrorism: Facing the global terrorist threat: a European response. Brussels, European
Policy Centre, Working Paper 14, January 2005
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tion might potentially occur, so that tactics and means can be devised to repress
them. Radical mosques rank high amongst obvious hot spots, but prisons,12
schools, neglected city districts and internet chat rooms spring easily to mind
too.
However, repression of recruitment mechanisms will not in itself prove sufficient
to effectively deal with terrorism. To dam up the complex jihadi terrorism in the
post-al-Qaeda era, counterterrorism efforts, both domestically and internation-
ally, therefore will have to go beyond mere repressive tactics and increasingly
rely on other policy instruments, which are more explicitly political than has
been the case so far. Prioritising possible root causes will allow for a strategy of
addressing the factors thus identified, one by one.
Dealing with local  root causes in the EU
Stressing the radicalisation process as the main track for counterterrorism runs
the risk of overstating the potential results of a purely repressive approach, by
leaving a most vital, but less palpable question unaddressed: why do individuals
– in particular second and third generation youngsters from North-African
descent, age 15-18 – appear to be most receptive to radicalisation in Europe?
Without acknowledging the dynamics that lead these youngsters down this
path, EU authorities and member states will never be able to be abreast of
events, and will constantly be confronted with the situation that for every ‘rad-
icalised would-be terrorist’ caught, a new one is in the making, the source of
potential recruits seemingly inexhaustible.
Therefore, next to the need of an ever increasing intra-EU coordination of the
intelligence agencies, police and judiciary, a second and equally important
domestic dimension must be borne in mind. Even if remnants of the al-Qaeda
network probably still exist and some recruiters with a mujahideen background
are still around, in Europe as of lately a growing tendency of self-radicalisation
and self-recruitment of individuals has been noted. Self-recruitment now
appears to have become a more important source of jihadi recruitment than any
organised international network of recruiters. Self-recruitment is largely the
result of an individual track of self-radicalisation, based upon a process of per-
sonal re-identification, outside customary meeting places such as mosques.
12. The group ‘Martyrs pour le Maroc’, created by the Algerian Mohammed Achraf, is an example
of a network originating from the thousands of North-African inmates in the (Spanish) prisons,
detained for minor criminal offences.
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This process of self-propelled radicalisation is couched in religious terms –
Takfir wal-Hijra being the most radical expression of jihadi activism – but Islam
is not the essence. A failing integration is.
Second- and third-generation youngsters of North-African descent are more vul-
nerable to this process, due to the absence of any other means of positive iden-
tification. No longer able to identify with the country of origin of their parents
or grand-parents, the countries they now live in constitute their sole natural
environment for identification. Within this environment however, and to the
difference of their non-migrant peers, they are confronted with a number of real
obstacles, in particular discriminations on the job and the real estate market and
educational deficiencies.13 European cities always have been characterised by a
form of segregation, with low income districts on the one hand and high-income
districts on the other hand, with significant disparities in education and city
services. Traditional low-income districts have attracted the bulk of migrant
families in search of affordable housing – which in turn has stimulated an exo-
dus of original inhabitants. Within migrant communities, despair and discour-
agement nowadays prevail with regard to their youngsters’ chances of overcom-
ing these situations in the foreseeable future.
Unable to identify with their parents’ identities and usually better educated than
them, they are more sensitive than their parents to the feeling of being excluded
or rejected by their natural environment as second-class citizens. Their father’s
mosques do not capture their imagination, since the (often foreign) imams do
not offer them a message they can identify with. They create their own subcul-
ture, withdraw from many social contacts, and sever family ties. As a result,
these youngsters have a tendency to become an introverted generation. Many
embrace Islam as their new identity, thereby interpreting it in concordance with
their own life experiences and sometimes even as a kind of redemption for their
petty criminal behaviour in the past.14 Their interpretation of Islam is usually
much more socially conservative than the Islam in their parents’ countries of
origin.
In a vicious circle of frustration and dissatisfaction, youngsters from migrant
communities choose the easiest way out and pose themselves as victims, project-
ing onto society whatever ill-fortune they encounter. They form the hard core of
radical groups of Salafist Islamists and rapidly radicalise into self-declared local
vanguards of the worldwide jihad, sometimes under the influence of a charis-
13. In the recent literature on Western Muslims, one can refer to: David Masci, ‘An uncertain road:
Muslims and the future of Europe’, in: The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, December 2004
14. A similar point was raised in: Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tussen salafitische
missie, radicaliseringsprocessen en Islamistisch terrorisme. AIVD, June 2004
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matic individual. By seemingly acting in community with a worldwide liberation
struggle they develop a sense of self-esteem. This feeling of commonality with
jihadi theatres of war is the ultra radicalised and polarising version of a more
general sense of increased solidarity among Muslims worldwide, as revealed by
surveys by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Zogby International.15 As was
noticed by the French Renseignements Généraux in 2004, some city quarters
have tended to become ‘jihadised’ this way.
However, contrary to widespread perceptions, migrant communities do not
form monolithic blocs. Within migrant communities in Europe, discussions rage
on how best to handle radicalised youngsters. But for a number of reasons, these
communities are unable to cope with this issue solely by themselves. They need
a permissive environment that enables them to tilt the balance in their favour.
This environment is the responsibility of both migrant communities and their
fellow-countrymen.
On the one hand, Tariq Ramadan, Europe’s leading Muslim intellectual, is quite
explicit when he addresses Western Muslims’ self-identification as a people
apart and wallowing in what he calls an ‘unhealthy victim mentality’ and an ‘us-
against-them’ mind-set. This perception of victimization and obsession with a
minority status must be rejected, according to Ramadan, who further implores
Western Muslims to reach out and connect with fellow citizens in their countries
of residence, to resist the impulse to withdraw into isolated communities and to
get involved in community politics.
On the other hand, for this effort within migrant communities to succeed, they
need to find a partner in European societies and authorities. Many non-Muslims
have no clue about the degree to which Muslims feel excluded from society. In
some European countries, migrant communities are requesting means for
launching a major awareness program, especially directed towards their young-
sters, as well as for an increased professionalism of migrant organizations. Such
schemes provide for an opportunity to further the much-needed structured
cooperation with migrant communities, allowing for a possible gradual waning
of the polarising mirror images.
15. Views of a changing world. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2003; ‘Muslims in the
American public square: Shifting political winds & fallout from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq’,
Zogby International, conducted in August and September 2004. In his speech at the Council on
Foreign Relations in Washington, in May 2004, (former) Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok
Tong made a similar analysis: “It is a fact that there is a living, vibrant Islamic ummah or global
Islamic community more so today than in any time in modern world history.” 
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The main task for authorities lies in the formulation of a common project that
is able to bind migrant and non-migrant communities into a shared sense of
communality. Equity probably comes closest to expressing the nature of this
endeavour. A significant responsibility lies upon the shoulders of local and
national authorities. The combination of feelings within migrant communities
of being left aside and amongst the original inhabitants in low-income city dis-
tricts of being pushed aside have proven to be a potent boost for reciprocal
polarisation, as can be judged from the electoral successes of far-right political
parties in many European countries.
Authorities must be seen as making significant efforts at ending city segregation
by bold social engineering and neutralizing discriminations of all sorts, by what-
ever political party, structure or individual.16 Education needs to be boosted so
as to provide all youngsters with the same opportunities. Local authorities need
to enhance multicultural awareness programs for police units operating in spe-
cific city districts.
Moreover, a much needed concrete step which both media and politicians can
take is to cease to explain complex community problems by sweeping generali-
sations about cultural backwardness.17 Islam provides a rationale for would-be
terrorists, but is not the origin of their acts. The commonly heard rebuttals of
Islam as a religion are deeply offensive to all Muslims. Such discourse can easily
result in the formation of conflicting ethnic-religious fronts pitting Muslims
against non-Muslims.18 The Lebanese-born French essayist Amin Maalouf has
argued convincingly that language and religion are the most vulnerable and sen-
sitive dimensions of one’s identity. When individuals feel attacked in one of these
aspects, they start looking for others experiencing the same vexation. The group
thus created then easily reverts to the kind of brutal and extremist group behav-
iour that could be witnessed in Rwanda, Bosnia or Lebanon.19
The current debate on integration and multiculturalism in many European
countries tends to breed a climate which encourages individuals and groups of
fanatical and volunteering young men to declare themselves the vanguards of a
‘defensive jihad’. By their acts – not that different altogether from the 19th cen-
16. In their elaborate letter to parliament dated 10 November 2004 and dealing with the murder of
Theo van Gogh, the Dutch ministers of Justice and Interiors, Messrs. Donner and Remkes, also
stress the need to connect youngsters from migrant communities with Dutch society by removing
the impediments to social and economic participation.
17. The Dutch intelligence agency AIVD made a similar – and widely criticised – comment in its:
Rekrutering in Nederland voor de jihad. Den Haag, AIVD, 9 December 2002
18. Karen Phalet (red.), Moslim in Nederland. Een onderzoek naar de religieuze betrokkenheid van
Turken en Marokkanen. Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, juni 2004
19. Amin Maalouf, Les identités meurtrières. Paris, Grasset, 1998
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tury anarchist terrorist’s claim of acting in favour of a marginalised and despised
working class – young jihadists see themselves as avengers of an oppressed com-
munity, willing to perform ritual killings, such as the brutal murder of Theo van
Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004. A climate also which offers plenty of
opportunities to Islamist recruiters and is propitious to self-recruitment. A cli-
mate finally which perpetuates the gap of misunderstanding between non-Mus-
lims and Muslims, rendering more difficult the much needed joint effort directed
against radicalisation and discrimination. Polarisation only breeds more polar-
isation.
Authorities and the media need to de-dramatise their common parlance. When
confronted with incidents – especially when of a dramatic nature – involving
youngsters of North-African descent, it does make a huge difference if the reac-
tion is a ‘declaration of war against Muslim terrorists’ or a condemnation of
these incidents as the unacceptable behaviour of a small group of young thugs,
whatever their origin may be.
De-escalating the debate on multiculturalism is a necessary first step to this
effect. Only when patiently described and explained the inherent difficulties of
a multicultural society will people, Europeans and migrant communities alike,
less fear its unknowns. This should make it possible to create an enabling envi-
ronment for a more harmonious debate within migrant communities of Muslim
descent on the place and role of Muslims in the Western world.
If on the contrary the polarization within Western and, more specifically, Euro-
pean societies is permitted to metastasize, Osama bin Laden will have won by
default, since polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims was uppermost
in his mind when authorizing the 11 September attacks.20
It is unfortunate, but the – natural – difficulties arising from large migration
flows and their ensuing integration, now have become intertwined with the ter-
rorism issue, the result being that harmonious integration has turned into a
Herculean task. Even if there were no terrorism threat, a satisfactory integration
of youngsters from minority communities as full members of Western societies
would not happen without significant efforts on both sides. But this has now
become all the more urgent, since ultimately such an effort will prove to be the
only antidote capable of halting the consequences of insidious (self)manipula-
tion.
20. A similar warning was also raised by a Dutch parliamentary commission charged with evaluat-
ing the Dutch intelligence agency: De AIVD in verandering. Den Haag, Commissie Bestuurlijke
Evaluatie AIVD, November 2004.
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Dealing with root  causes outside of  the EU
Outside Europe the root causes of jihadi terrorism are mainly local too. Islamist
terrorism predates the emergence of al-Qaeda in the 1990s. It varies in history,
scope and lethality, depending on the regions and the countries involved. There-
fore, the responsibility and the capacity for dealing with them mainly lie with
local authorities. In some of these local root causes, the international commu-
nity and the EU have a stake and a means of influencing the outcome. But in
most, the levers are only indirect.
Poverty in itself is no root cause of terrorism. Notwithstanding conventional
wisdom, there is no direct causal link between poverty and terrorism.21 If pov-
erty would be a primary motive of terrorism, international terrorism would be
a constant major thread in history (instead of evolving in successive waves).
Moreover, Africa, the continent that has been mired in pervasive poverty for
decades and disposes of a per capita income that is now lower than it was in the
beginning of the 60s, would nowadays be the scene and source of major terrorist
activities. In most African countries however little or no terrorism exists.
The same goes for failed and failing states. They can be hotbeds of brigand,
warlordish or ethnic violence, which sometimes can be widespread, as has been
the case in Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, but they do not breed terrorist
violence. They are not root causes of terrorism. They only offer at the most a
facilitating environment for terrorists. Addressing these situations would in the
first place be a blessing for the populations concerned, and contain the danger
of regional contamination, but it would hardly have a major impact on terrorist
activities.22
Autonomy/separatism. In a number of countries one cannot but fail to notice
that many so-called ‘Islamist terrorist movements’, in particular in Southeast
Asia, are interlinked with long-time disputes over territory and autonomy.23 Al-
21. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: is
there a causal connection? Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, May 2002; Walter
Laqueur, ‘The Terrorism to Come’, in: Policy Review, 126, August-September 2004
22. To this effect, the December 2004 Report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change proposes the creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council. Its core
functions would be to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State col-
lapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing
that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and
post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international
community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.
23. The history of some of the radical Islamist movements goes back as far as a century, as is the
case in the Philippines. See: Terrorism in Southeast Asia. CRS Report for Congress, 13 August
2004 (updated 7 February 2005)
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Qaeda has capitalised on these pre-existing conflicts. But even in these situations
it should be born in mind that violent jihadi groups only represent a tiny minor-
ity, even among Islamist groups.
The responsibility of local governments here is paramount. But if the European
Union wants to be seen as an effective and even-handed player in long-lasting
conflicts, the EU and its member states need to enhance their long-term conflict
resolution strategy, making full use of the whole spectrum of means and instru-
ments at their disposal. This would further be in consistency with their stated
objectives of “integrating the fight against terrorism into EU external relations
policy”24 and of supporting the UN as the most appropriate multilateral forum
for conflict resolution.
As proven in the past, if this longing is popular amongst the concerned popula-
tion, a purely repressive track can never defeat separatism. If the international
community supports the repressive tactics of a local government in the name of
a global endeavour against terrorism, it will inevitably be perceived as support-
ive of a repressive regime and contribute to the emergence of anti-Western sen-
timents in the concerned population. If however a separatist group, not
grounded in popular sentiment and not justifiable as a reaction to widespread
and longstanding governmental repression,25 turns violent, then support to a
democratically elected government is justified, providing this government
respects fundamental human rights and the Geneva conventions. Most of
today’s counterterrorism assistance is bilateral. In order for this assistance to be
viewed as legitimate, it might be advisable to provide for a multilateral frame-
work of fixed rules. Addressing this issue, the December 2004 Report by the
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has proposed the UN
Security Council to enhance its role in this respect:
“Because United Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical
support, States seeking operational support for counter-terrorism
activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance. A United
Nations capacity to facilitate this assistance would in some instances
ease domestic political constraints, and this can be achieved by pro-
viding for the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a
clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and bor-
der control assistance for the development of domestic counterterror-
ism capacities. The Security Council, after consultation with affected
24. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 17/18 June 2004 (Doc 10679/2/04 Rev 2)
25. Abu Sayyef in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipel is an example of such a group.
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States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Execu-
tive Directorate to perform this function.”26
Political extremism used to be a more important root cause of terrorism in the
70s and 80s than it is today. Most often, its effects are rather circumscribed and
primarily local. The German Rote Armee Fraktion, Action Directe in France, the
CCC in Belgium or the Brigate Rosse in Italy, all displayed the same character-
istics of political extremism and lack of popular support.27 Religious extremism
broadly falls within this category. When political channels for dissenting opin-
ions are functioning and safeguards for religious and ethnic minorities exist,
terrorism is always the modus operandi of splinter groups.28 Such terrorist
groups can successfully be eliminated by a combination of infiltration, national
reforms and collaboration with those regretting their former choices, by the law
and in full respect of the law. But, as will be explored below, in today’s current
wave of jihadi terrorism, religious extremism acts as a booster for terrorism –
without religion actually being the main driver. Intercultural and interreligious
dialogue can help soften the prevalent polarised atmosphere, but its long-term
effects upon terrorism should not be overstated.
The Middle East probably represents the major source of (potential) terrorist
activities. To Europe the region has always been of particular importance, since
it represents a ‘Near’ rather than a ‘Middle’ East. Europe has a vital interest in
the region, not in the least since this region provides for the bulk of its immigra-
tion since the 60s.
Often ignored in the West, long before the first victims fell in New York and
Washington tens of thousands of Muslims and Arab citizens had been murdered
in a wave of terrorist attacks in Arab and Muslim countries. A conservative
estimate puts the number of victims in the Muslim world at some 175.000
– mostly in the Maghreb – compared to some 4.000 Western victims since the
start of the current wave of Islamist and jihadi terrorism in the early 90s. The
year 2004 once again saw a marked increase in attacks against local targets in
Muslim countries – a chilling reminder of the 1990s pattern.
The impasse in many Arab countries provides for the main root cause of local
Islamist terrorism. Most Arab societies have been living in a crisis for more than
twenty years: growing unemployment, emigration of the highly educated, dicta-
26. A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change. Washington, United Nations, December 2004
27. Aum Shinrikyo in Japan can also be considered to fall within this category.
28. IBDA-C in Turkey can be considered to fall within this category.
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torships, all kinds of societal violence, repression and impoverishment. Since the
demise of secular populist movements and of pan-Arabism, populations no
longer expect anything from their leaders. They demand solutions without
exactly knowing what these should be. This social crisis is due to a number of
different, overlapping causes. The social systems no longer meet the needs of the
people. While the economic system turns out more and more highly educated
unemployed, a real connection is lacking between the educational system and
the labour market. The political system is founded on military, bureaucratic and
administrative control of the population and does not allow any form of real
participation. “Just as the failure of Arab democratization movements in the
1980s gave birth to the Islamist fundamentalist tidal wave, the defeats inflicted
on this mass-based and hence political fundamentalism have given birth to an
armed extremist Islamism that has come to represent its globalization.”29
Resolving this domestic impasse does not lie within the means of Western coun-
tries. No increase of development aid will do. The sheer magnitude of the task
of breaking the impasse in the Arab world and dealing with the dynamics in the
region mandates modesty in Western policy. Change has to come from within
Arab societies themselves. Fortunately, there are some positive signs – the impact
of which cannot be assessed as yet – that today the Muslim world is witnessing
numerous efforts at introspection and reflection upon its own responsibilities.
A first post-9/11 sign that introspection is indeed occurring within the Muslim
world at large is the manifesto published by 160 religious Saudi scientists and
scholars in the spring of 2002 in which they pleaded for a more intensive dia-
logue with the West. At the time the manifesto was greeted with a torrent of
conservative criticism, but it nevertheless shows that there are now Muslims
who are cautiously criticizing the intolerant nature of Saudi society and educa-
tion. Regional meetings focusing on the how and why of the region’s own fail-
ures are now held throughout the Middle East.
That is also what the notorious Arab Human Development Report 2002 is
about. It was written on the initiative of a group of Arab intellectuals with the
support of the UNDP. The report as well as the follow-up publications condemn
the lack of political freedom, the oppression of women and the isolation of Arab
science as the main causes for the development lag in the Arab world. The first
report was a bombshell. It was downloaded from the Internet one million times,
as the authors discovered. The third one was released in April 2005 and went
29. Burhan Ghalioun, ‘The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism’, in: Journal of Democracy,
October 2004, 15:4. See also his interview in Le Monde, 25 March 2002.
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even further in examining the ways in which the Arab polity could be radically
transformed.30
The reports’ lead author, the Egyptian scholar Nader Fergany, holds the view
that the Arab and Muslim regimes bear a heavy responsibility with regard to the
present malaise. But the same goes for the West which, under the pretext of
spreading freedom and democracy, has not hesitated to support regimes that
trample these very ideas. This confronts Western countries, the EU and the
United States alike, once again with the all too familiar dilemma between stabil-
ity and democracy. The international community’s approach towards the region
has always privileged the former to the detriment of the latter. Unpopular Arab
regimes – keeping in check the seething anger of their populations by force –
have thus benefited from the complaisance, and sometimes even the uncondi-
tional support, of the West.
This dilemma reflects a conflict between the short-term and longer-term inter-
ests of Europe’s common foreign and security policy. In consistency with its pro-
claimed objective of integrating the fight against terrorism into its common for-
eign and security policy, the EU could play a vital role in waging the battle for
the hearts and minds of peoples in the Middle East.
For Europe it is of vital importance to neutralize the commonly held view which
persists in the Arab world of a West which is only interested in securing its own
interests by bolstering authoritarian regimes at the expense of democracy pro-
motion. If this does not happen, the democratisation process in the Middle East
– that prudently started more than half a decade ago and got an impulse with
the introspection and reflection upon its own responsibilities that started after
9/11 – will again result in anti-Western populism and stimulate the emergence
of more intensely anti-Western regimes, so Burhan Ghalioun, director of the
Sorbonne’s Centre d'Etudes sur l'Orient Contemporain, has warned.
The main CFSP instrument in this regard is the European-Mediterranean Part-
nership, the so-called Barcelona Process. The dilemma between short term and
long term objectives needs to be addressed within this framework, by enhancing
the dynamics of the European-Mediterranean Partnership, especially in its polit-
ical, cultural and economic dimensions.
A particular way for overcoming this dilemma is the creation of informal chan-
nels between European officials and Arab reformers, of liberal and moderate
30. Arab Human Development Report 2004. Towards Freedom in the Arab World. New York,
UNDP, 2005. Burhan Ghalioun was one of the many contributors to this report.
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Islamic orientation alike, with the aim of fostering gender empowerment, polit-
ical freedom, rule of law and civil liberties. In the past, Europe has privileged
encounters with liberal reformers. Taking into account that only a very small
minority of Islamists are in favour of the violent, confrontational strategy, as
endorsed by Osama bin Laden, it might be advisable to take into account broad-
ening the spectrum of potential partners in the region, as some observers have
been suggesting as of lately. Most Islamist movements have now accepted dem-
ocratic norms and principles, while simultaneously adopting a modernist atti-
tude to Islamic law. This tendency is embodied in the Muslim Brothers, the
Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) and the Turkish Justice and
Development Party (AKP). They accept the state not only as the framework for
their main activity but also as legitimate in itself, thus abandoning fundamental-
ist views which deny legitimacy to the nation by counter-posing to it the
Ummah, the supra-national community of believers.31
European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the
region is risky for both the EU and the Islamists themselves. Both fear a hidden
agenda behind the other’s intentions, yet both stand to gain from a systematic
dialogue on democracy. As has been argued by El-Din Shahin of the American
University in Cairo, an even-handed approach by which Europe is moderately
vocal but firm and consistent with the ruling regimes and as consistent and vocal
with their Islamist partners as to the respect of the basic rules of democracy, will
elevate democracy promotion to have the same salience as social and economic
reform.32 As a first step in exploring this issue, Dr. Ahmed Idrees, the Egyptian-
born European Affairs Correspondent of the BBC Arab service in Brussels, has
suggested the creation of an ad-hoc unit of experts on Islamic extremism, at the
disposal of both the Council and the Commission. This unit could help Euro-
pean decision-making by monitoring and analysing the trends and causes of
religious extremism in the Muslim and Arab world and present policy recom-
mendations for specific measures.
A specific aspect of the West’s involvement with Middle Eastern affairs which is
linked to international terrorism, concerns the peace process between Palestini-
ans and Israelis. The daily pictures from the Middle East, more than those of any
other international tragedy, have kept fuelling the perception within the Muslim
world of a hostile West. Over the past years this has led to the political conflict
between Palestinians and Israelis being perceived as a religious conflict between
Muslims on the one hand and Jews, supported by the Christian West, on the
31. Understanding Islamism. Brussels, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa
Report N° 37, 2 March 2005
32. Emad El-Din Shahin, Political Islam: Ready for Engagement? Madrid, Fride, Working paper 3,
February 2005
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other hand.33 It has driven a wedge between the West and the Islamic world and
has thus developed into an ideal rallying cause for both Islamist recruiters and
self-recruited jihadists. Ending the conflict between Palestine and Israel will cer-
tainly not suffice to halt Islamist terrorism. A renewed effort and a more bal-
anced attitude on the part of the international community with regard to this
conflict are nevertheless essential elements for a strategy aimed at conquering
the hearts and minds in the Middle East.
Arab reformers, and in particular the authors of the UNDP reports, stress the
need for Western support, but reject any direct outside intervention to bring
political change upon them.34 Iraq is a case in point. The invasion of Iraq struck
a deep chord with many Arab and Muslim people, partly because Baghdad was
the seat of the caliphate for several centuries (749-1258 CE), partly because of
its location near the heart of the holy places, and partly because it felt like an
additional humiliation by its implicit depiction of Arabs as being unable to bring
down their own dictators.35 The Iraq war has probably reinforced the image of
a conquering West and has provided – for the time being at least – for an addi-
tional jihadi war zone36 and a potent propaganda tool for (self)recruitment,
superseding Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. As could be expected, Osama
bin Laden has tried to capitalise on the war in Iraq, depicting it at the end of
2004 as a central battle in a “Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist
coalition began against the Islamic Nation.”37
As far as the prospect of democratisation within the Middle East is concerned,
within the Arab world, leaders and people alike, Iraq is now probably seen as
an example of chaos resulting from imposed change, rather than as a model of
democratisation to emulate. From the leaders’ perspective, the ease with which
Saddam was discarded must have increased their own sense of vulnerability
towards their people and their reluctance to pursue the modest endeavours
towards political change.
33. Maurits Berger in: NRC-Handelsblad, 27 March 2004
34. Arab Human Development Report 2003. New York, UNDP, 2003, p. 27
35. At the 31st session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in June 2004, departing Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Abdelouahed Belkezziz, spoke of a ‘debilitating
feeling of impotence’, albeit in another context. This expression however captures a mood that is
widespread in the Arab world. 
36. It should be noted that the number of foreign jihadists in Iraq has always been a matter of con-
tention, with estimates widely diverging. In his testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, on 16 February 2005, Gen. Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
expressed the view widely shared among observers that foreign fighters are a fairly small percent-
age of the total number of insurgents in Iraq, the core being comprised of Sunni Arabs (Washington
Post, 17 February 2005).
37. Quoted in: Christopher Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: statements and evolving ideology’, in: CRS
Report for Congress, 4 February 2005
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Bridging the global  perception gap
Even if the success of an effective counterterrorism strategy essentially rests
upon the effectiveness of local actions, where EU levers are mostly indirect, one
also has to bear in mind the global dimension, which is composed of the twin
characteristics of solidarity and humiliation all Muslim communities nowadays
experience. Osama bin Laden was able to exert a heavy imprint, precisely
because of these prevalent feelings of humiliation, bitterness and besiegement
that were already present within the Muslim world and migrant communities
with a Muslim background.
In order to be successful at the local level, action at the global level is also nec-
essary for containing and ultimately rolling back the momentum on which ter-
rorism is thriving today.
The American journalist Thomas Friedman has pointed out that most observers
failed to notice a crucial part in an otherwise notorious farewell speech by
Malaysian President Mahatir Mohamed at the end of October 2003. Everyone
condemned the anti-Semitic fragments, and rightly so, but because of this they
missed his lucid diagnosis of the situation within the Muslim world. Mahatir
talked about the feelings of humiliation, oppression and hopelessness which are
prevalent in the Muslim world today, about the dignity of 1.3 billion Muslims
being pushed aside and about the marginalization of Muslim communities all
over the world. This, according to Mahatir, gives rise to anger and angry people
do not think straight. “The single most underappreciated force in international
relations is humiliation,” was Friedman’s conclusion.38
Mohammed Ayoon of Michigan State University makes a similar point: “The
common denominator among Islamists (...) is the quest for dignity, a variable
often ignored by contemporary political analysts in the West.”39
The War on Terrorism does not provide for hope, or dignity. It only expresses
anger and fear. What is most needed today is a perspective that will help neu-
tralize the feeling of marginalization felt in “that vast and populous section of
the world, stretching from the Maghreb through the Middle East and Central
Asia into South and South-East Asia and beyond to the Philippines: overpopu-
lated, underdeveloped, being dragged headlong by the West into the post-mod-
38. Thomas Friedman, ‘The Humiliation Factor’, in: New York Times, 9 November 2003. Sir
Michael Howard made a similar analysis in: ‘Mistake to declare this a war.’ Speech by Michael
Howard at the Royal United Services Institute, 31 October 2001
39. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Political Islam: Image and Reality’, in: World Policy Journal, Fall 2004,
pp. 1-14
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ern page before they have come to terms with modernity”, as Sir Michael
Howard, President-Emeritus of the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies, depicted it.
Since outside intervention rarely produces genuine political change within coun-
tries, the main contribution the West can make is helping to create a global
environment that facilitates domestic reform and economic growth in the world,
thus helping to neutralise the widespread image of a conquering or indifferent
West.
Terrorism and security concerns are distracting Western policymakers in the rich
countries from long-term development goals and from paying sufficient atten-
tion to the sources of insecurity which many outside the West perceive as a
greater threat to their own survival than terrorism: civil wars, poverty, disease,
organised crime or environmental degradation. Inequitable responses to threats
further the perception that what passes for international security is the security
of the rich and powerful, as was suggested by the aforementioned High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In Part I of its December 2004
Report, the Panel points out that:
“The credibility of any system of collective security also depends on
how well it promotes security for all its members, without regard to
the nature of would-be beneficiaries, their location, resources or rela-
tionship to great Powers.”
Inequity is the main characteristic of today’s international system: huge dispar-
ities in wealth, opportunities, empowerment and participation in (international
and national) decision-making, together with an absence of perspectives on how
to reduce these inequities. This widely shared perception of global inequity
largely explains Osama bin Laden’s success in linking disparate local groups
under his global banner, pinning the West against the oppressed – much like the
end of the 19th century, when a similar environment of global inequity enabled
anarchist terrorists to present their attacks in terms broadly analogous to
today’s jihadi’s.
No quick fix exists for rectifying this perception gap. No revitalised public
diplomacy effort will do. It can only be addressed by restoring a minimal sense
of community at the global level through a long-term effort aimed at the crea-
tion of a more just and fair world, built on shared priorities and concerns and
founded on institutions, representative of the entire world population and
where there is place for the interests and self-esteem of all members. Global
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governance, that is how Nader Fergany, the lead author of the Arab Human
Development Reports, named this perspective at the 2003 IRRI-KIIB interna-
tional conference in Brussels on the root causes of international terrorism.40
One track the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy could pursue is explic-
itly advancing the goal of acting upon the recommendations of the December
2004 Report by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and
the ensuing recommendations by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, issued in
March 2005 for deliberation and decision by the world leaders during a special
Millennium review Summit in September 2005.41
Putting this encompassing vision of an inclusive world order at the centre of its
CFSP and matching the rhetoric by concrete actions and by toning down the
rhetoric that depicts terrorism as the single most important challenge for the
whole international community, the EU will contribute to creating the reassur-
ing international environment that will allow reformers in Arab and Muslim
countries to be freed from the constant reproach of being mere agents of West-
ern policies, thereby strengthening their ability to deal with the roots of the
feelings of resentment, malaise and marginalization in their own countries and
to find a way out of the domestic malaise. It will also make it easier to come to
grips with the current intra-Islam debates between moderates and extremists
– debates non-Muslims can hardly be expected to be successfully involved in.
The fatwa by the Islamic Commission of Spain denouncing Osama bin Laden as
an apostate, in March 2005, was not widely noticed outside Muslim communi-
ties, but is not a trivial matter for these communities. It might force other Mus-
lim authorities to express similar views, thus further de-legitimizing Osama bin
Laden’s interpretation of Islam and jihad.
Ultimately, the strategy of terror as a solution to the malaise felt by Muslim and
migrant communities will prove to be as much a dead-end as it turned out to be
for the anarchists when they tried to fight the marginalization of the 19th-cen-
tury labour movement. None of the causes that al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists are
said to pursue will be advanced through this strategy of violence. Quite the con-
trary is true. This strategy is self-defeating and will ultimately isolate the extrem-
ists from the communities in whose name they claim to act. But in order for this
to become true as swiftly as possible, the perspective of a more inclusive inter-
national agenda and action is necessary. Without this, terrorism will keep on
40. http://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/terrorism/fergany.pdf
41. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human right for all. New York, United
Nations, 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005)
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smouldering, even after the eventual capture of Osama bin Laden. Only when
hope is offered, will the breeding ground for terrorism dry out.
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